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HELLER’S COLLATERAL DAMAGE:  




A longstanding firearm regulation in the United States prohibits individual 
convicted of felonies and certain misdemeanors from possessing a firearm.  
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, waves of litigation challenged, among other laws, the felon-in-
possession prohibition.  Due to the lack of clarity in Heller and the Court’s 
refusal to address it, there is an unsettling circuit split over whether and how 
an individual can mount an as-applied challenge to the felon-in-possession 
prohibition. 
A decade after Heller, the Third Circuit upheld the first successful as-
applied challenge while four circuits have denied the permissibility of these 
challenges, creating an urgent need for clarification from the Court.  
Because the Court denied certiorari in the Third Circuit case, the present 
state of the law is that an individual’s right to restore their Second 
Amendment rights is determined by where they live.  The resulting issue 
cannot be relegated to the gun control debate and instead represents a 
constitutional dilemma that demands resolution by the Court.  This Note 
argues that the Court is shirking its duties and should not continue to leave 
a fundamental right subject to an individual’s residence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Far more important are the unfortunate consequences that today’s decision 
is likely to spawn.  Not least of these, as I have said, is the fact that the 
decision threatens to throw into doubt the constitutionality of gun laws 
throughout the United States.1 
—Justice Breyer 
One of the many collateral consequences of a felony conviction is the 
federal prohibition on possessing a firearm.  Commonly known as the “felon-
in-possession” law, this prohibition is one of the longstanding firearm 
regulations dating back to the nation’s founding.2  Codified in 18 U.S.C 
§ 922(g),3 the statute’s first subsection expressly prohibits individuals who 
have been convicted of a felony or certain misdemeanors—along with other 
enumerated classes of individuals—from possessing, shipping, or receiving 
firearms or ammunition through any interstate commerce.4  Among all of the 
subsections of the statute, § 922(g)(1) is the most prosecuted.5  In fact, the 
felon-in-possession prohibition is the fifth-most charged offense in the 
federal system.6  This is not surprising because as the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) has stated, § 922(g)(1) violations are “generally simple and quick to 
 
 1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 722 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 2. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). 
 4. Id. § 922(g)(1). 
 5. See, e.g., Daniel Reiss & Melissa A. Anderson, Post-Heller Second Amendment 
Litigation:  An Overview, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL., Nov. 2015, at 1, 8 (noting that “the 
relatively large number of persons prosecuted each year under either provision, particularly 
section 922(g)(1)”); Federal Criminal Prosecutions Fall Under Trump, TRACREPORTS (Sept. 
1, 2017), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/480 [https://perma.cc/CY88-TAFY]. 
 6. Federal Criminal Prosecutions Fall Under Trump, supra note 5.  Firearm provisions 
in the federal system are charged at a significantly lower rate than drug-related or immigration 
crimes, which collectively make up over 60 percent of individuals. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
2016 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.A, at S-11 (2016), 
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2016 [https://perma.cc/6WLG-2Z49].  Firearm 
offenses are the third-most-charged category, but they make up about 10 percent of all 
individuals sentenced in the federal system. Id.   
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prove.”7  To establish a § 922(g)(1) violation, federal prosecutors only need 
to prove (1) that the individual was convicted of a crime with a maximum 
possible sentence exceeding one year8 and (2) his or her actual or 
constructive possession of a firearm.9  Thus, the DOJ has advised federal 
prosecutors that firearm violations, like § 922(g)(1), “should be aggressively 
used.”10 
Though § 922(g)(1) only made up about 8 percent of all federal charges 
filed in the last year,11 the Trump administration has promised “aggressive 
enforcement of federal firearm laws against those persons prohibited from 
possessing firearms.”12  In fact, U.S. Attorney General (AG) Jeff Sessions 
announced a “new and modernized” Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) 
program, which seeks to better coordinate gun violence reduction efforts on 
local, state, and federal levels—the DOJ’s centerpiece for crime reduction.13  
If the current iteration of PSN mirrors its 2001 counterpart, § 922(g)(1) 
charges will increase significantly in coming years.14 
Though longstanding and aggressively enforced, the legality of § 922(g)(1) 
has been questioned following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in District 
of Columbia v. Heller15 in 2008.16  In fact, a “fractured” Third Circuit sitting 
en banc became the first circuit to uphold a successful as-applied challenge 
to the longstanding felon-in-possession prohibition in 2016,17 largely due to 
Heller’s lack of guidance.18 
In Heller, the Court undertook its first “in-depth examination of the Second 
Amendment”19 and held that the Amendment protects the right of an 
 
 7. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 112, https://www.justice.gov/ 
usam/criminal-resource-manual [https://perma.cc/M9PP-VL34]. 
 8. For state misdemeanors, the maximum possible sentence must exceed two years. 18 
U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(b). 
 9. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2015). 
 10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, § 112. 
 11. Quick Facts:  Felon in Possession of a Firearm, U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, 
https://www.ussc.gov/research/quick-facts/section-922g-firearms [https://perma.cc/V97M-
82JW]. 
 12. Project Safe Neighborhoods:  An Overview of the Strategy, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL., 
Jan. 2002, at 1, 3. 
 13. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at the Major Cities Chiefs Association 
2017 Fall Meeting About Project Safe Neighborhoods and Other Initiatives to Reduce Violent 
Crime (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-
delivers-remarks-major-cities-chiefs-association-2017-fall [https://perma.cc/Q4DN-YB8L].  
PSN was introduced by the DOJ in 2001 under President George W. Bush as a 
“comprehensive, strategic approach to reducing gun violence in America.” Project Safe 
Neighborhoods:  An Overview of the Strategy, supra note 12, at 1. 
 14. Compare Federal Criminal Prosecutions Fall Under Trump, supra note 5, with Ten 
Year Decline in Federal Weapons Convictions, TRACREPORTS (Nov. 7, 2017), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/409/ (showing the highest number of weapons-related 
offenses from 2004 to 2008 during PSN) [https://perma.cc/48K6-4BP9]. 
 15. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 16. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 8. 
 17. Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847). 
 18. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 19. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
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individual, in addition to militias, to keep and bear arms.20  Groundbreaking 
though it was, Heller left large gaps in Second Amendment jurisprudence, as 
presciently noted by dissents written by Justices John Paul Stevens21 and 
Breyer.22  In addition to not prescribing which standard of constitutional 
scrutiny applies, the Court created confusion when it declared, nonchalantly, 
that certain longstanding prohibitions on Second Amendment rights were 
“presumptively lawful.”23  The Court failed to provide any guidance on the 
full extent of the longstanding prohibitions or any justification for the 
lawfulness.24 It stated that it would “expound” on these prohibitions “if and 
when” they are challenged before the Court.25  Without any explanation of 
the basis for the presumption and whether it is rebuttable, federal courts were 
left without guidance in the waves of post-Heller challenges to firearm 
regulations—particularly the felon-in-possession prohibition.26 
This Note explores how Heller’s confusing and limited guidance on 
Second Amendment challenges has resulted in federal courts sifting through 
Heller’s tea leaves.  The circuits have speculated and sometimes disagreed 
about how Heller should be read to determine, for example, what level of 
constitutional scrutiny to use and whether longstanding prohibitions are 
constitutional on their face or as applied.27  Despite some consensus among 
the circuits, there are multiple disagreements about what are permissible 
challenges and the scope and nature of the analysis.28  For example, most 
circuits have adopted some variation of a two-prong test created by the Third 
Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella.29  But among these circuits, the 
“precise formulation” of the test is not consistent.30  In some instances, the 
circuits have applied their tests to the same law but have arrived at different 
results.  For example, the Third Circuit upheld en banc the first successful as-
applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) in Binderup v. Attorney General.31  Four 
other circuits have “left the door open to a successful as-applied challenge” 
but have yet to uphold one, four circuits have rejected permissibility of the 
as-applied challenges, and three circuits have expressed concern about 
them.32  With such a deep circuit split, the Court needs to provide clarity 
about whether as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are permissible, and if so, 
what methods should be used to assess them. 
 
 20. See id. at 580–81. 
 21. See id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that Heller “leaves for future cases the 
formidable task of defining the scope of permissible regulations”). 
 22. See id. at 719 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that he “find[s] it difficult to understand 
the reasoning that seems to underlie certain conclusions [that the Heller Court] reaches”). 
 23. Id. at 627 & n.26 (majority opinion). 
 24. See id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 25. Id. at 635 (majority opinion). 
 26. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 8. 
 27. Id. at 8–9. 
 28. See id. at 9. 
 29. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 30. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 5. 
 31. 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-
847). 
 32. Id. at 381–85 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
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Indeed, the Court recently provided needed clarity for a different criminal 
statute by invalidating that statute’s clause based on its vagueness and the 
lack of judicial consensus on how to determine whether predicate offenses 
fell under the clause.33  That statute—the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA)—establishes a mandatory minimum for individuals charged under 
§ 922(g)(1) who have three predicate drug offenses or violent felonies.34  In 
addition to several enumerated felonies, the ACCA sets forth a residual 
clause, which states that an offense is a “violent felony” if it “otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”35  Before deciding Johnson v. United States36 in 2015, the Court 
sought to clarify the residual clause in four different cases beginning in 
2007.37  Between 2007 and 2015, lower courts were confounded as evidenced 
by the “pervasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one is 
supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.”38  
In evaluating the residual clause’s constitutionality, the Court held that 
“[i]nvoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 
years to life does not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee of due 
process.”39 
The disagreement settled in Johnson is analogous to the disagreement 
among the circuits present in the post-Heller as-applied challenges to 
§ 922(g)(1).  Yet, in June 2017, the Court denied certiorari to the DOJ’s 
appeal of Binderup40 despite stating in Heller that it would determine 
challenges to longstanding prohibitions—including the very statute at issue 
in Binderup, § 922(g)(1)—as they arose.41  Notably, Justices Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor both stated their disagreement with the denial of certiorari in 
Binderup,42 and this Note explains why they are correct. 
The current hodgepodge system for addressing as-applied challenges to 
§ 922(g)(1) is marked by splits among and within circuits and needs to be 
addressed by the Court.  This Note addresses the need for a standardized 
system or guidelines for courts faced with as-applied challenges to 
§ 922(g)(1).  By applying the analysis in Johnson, this Note highlights the 
constitutional concerns of a shapeless system that evaluates and sometimes 
restores Second Amendment rights, which the Court held to be fundamental 
two years after Heller in McDonald v. City of Chicago.43 
 
 33. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015). 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012); see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555.  
 35. 18 U.S.C § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
 36. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
 37. Id. at 2562 (noting the four previous cases:  James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 
(2007), Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 
(2009), and Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011)).  
 38. Id. at 2559–60.  
 39. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 40. Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847). 
 41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 42. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 2323. 
 43. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
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Part I provides an overview of § 922(g)(1) and a summary of federal 
judicial responses to facial and as-applied challenges to the statute.  It also 
provides an overview of Heller and McDonald as well as an examination of 
the Third Circuit’s two-prong test for post-Heller challenges to firearm 
regulations, including as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1).  Part II examines 
the void-for-vagueness doctrine and how the Court applied it in Johnson, 
which invalidated the residual clause of the ACCA.  Part III then assesses the 
constitutionality of the Third Circuit’s Binderup test and uses the Court’s 
rationale in Johnson to analyze it.  Finally, Part IV proposes potential 
legislative remedies to standardize the process for evaluating as-applied 
challenges to § 922(g)(1) and urges the Court to grant certiorari on the next 
case dealing with this issue due to the huge constitutional concerns of 
restoration of a fundamental right that varies based on where one lives. 
I.  CHALLENGING THE FELON-IN-POSSESSION PROHIBITION 
In Binderup, a fractured en banc Third Circuit upheld the first successful 
as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1).44  Before analyzing this decision, this 
Note explores the underlying statute and the legal challenges following 
Heller.  Part I.A provides an analysis of § 922(g)(1), including its historical 
justification, its elements, and its options for rights restoration.  Next, Part 
I.B explores how the Court failed to provide proper guidance in Heller and 
McDonald for federal courts on how to evaluate legal challenges to firearm 
regulations.  Part I.C then analyzes how the circuits responded to post-Heller 
facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), focusing primarily on the 
Third Circuit and its decision in Binderup. 
A.  Felon-in-Possession Prohibition:  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 
An understanding of § 922(g)(1) requires an historical analysis as well as 
an explanation of its elements and exceptions.  Part I.A.1 provides an 
overview of § 922(g)(1), including a brief recitation of its historical 
background and its current codification.  Part I.B.2 outlines the options 
provided by the statute for individuals impacted by § 922(g)(1) to have their 
Second Amendment rights restored. 
1.  Section 922(g)(1) Overview 
Prohibitions on individuals with felony convictions possessing firearms 
can be traced back to the nation’s founding.  In assessing § 922(g)(1)’s 
historical justification, many circuits point to scholarly and historical sources 
asserting that the right to bear arms is tied to “virtuous citizenry” and, thus, 
allowing the government to disarm “unvirtuous citizens.”45  Responding to 
Justice Stevens’s analysis of historical justification for the Second 
 
 44. Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 399 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323. 
 45. See, e.g., id. at 348 (citing United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 
2010)); United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979–80 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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Amendment, the Court in Heller notes a “highly influential” report from the 
founding era,46 which Stevens identifies as The Address and Reasons of 
Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to 
Their Constituents, 1787.47  In an excerpt provided by Stevens, the “highly 
influential” report asserted that the right to bear arms resides in the individual 
“unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury.”48 
The felon-in-possession law was first federally codified as part of the 
Federal Firearms Act of 1938,49 which one scholar called “the most 
significant pre-1968 attempt to impose federal controls on the commerce and 
possession of a broad spectrum of firearms.”50  The 1938 Act created a 
federal licensing system for firearm manufacturers, importers, and dealers, 
including a prohibition on licensees from knowingly shipping firearms to 
individuals convicted of a felony, “any person who is under indictment,” and 
other enumerated classes.51  Thirty years later, the Gun Control Act of 1968 
replaced portions of the 1938 Act by “extend[ing] . . . certain controls” on 
firearms52 in response to the growing number of firearm deaths and recent 
assassinations.53  One of the Gun Control Act’s purposes, as stated by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, was “to keep firearms out of the hands of those 
not legally entitled to possess them,” including those with a “criminal 
background.”54  Years later, the felon-in-possession prohibition is unchanged 
and vigorously enforced.55 
The prohibition on firearm possession for individuals convicted of felonies 
and certain misdemeanors is codified at § 922(g)(1), among other 
prohibitions on enumerated classes of individuals from shipping, possessing 
or receiving firearms or ammunition via interstate commerce.56  This Note 
only addresses the prohibition on individuals convicted of felonies. 
The felon-in-possession nomenclature for § 922(g)(1) provides insight into 
the law’s elements.  To violate the statute, an individual must have (1) been 
convicted of a “felony,” (2) possessed a firearm that affected interstate 
 
 46. Heller, 554 U.S. at 604. 
 47. Id. at 658 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting a rejected proposal for the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, which was later included in a critique of the U.S. Constitution). 
 48. Id. (citing 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 665 (1971)). 
 49. Federal Firearms Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-785, 52 Stat. 1250 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 901–910) (repealed 1968). 
 50. Franklin Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law:  The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 133, 139 (1975). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 902 (1964) (repealed 1968). 
 52. HARRY L. HOGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 85-166, GUN CONTROL ACT OF 1968, AS 
AMENDED:  DIGEST OF MAJOR PROVISIONS, at iii (1985). 
 53. See, e.g., PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES TRANSMITTING PROPOSALS FOR GUN CONTROL LAWS, H.R. DOC. NO. 332, at 1–2 
(1968); Zimring, supra note 50, at 146–47 (noting amendments created after the assassinations 
of President John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert F. Kennedy). 
 54. S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 22 (1968). 
 55. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 56. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). 
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commerce, and (3) had knowledge of the firearm possession.57  The word 
“felony” is a misnomer because an offense can qualify as a “crime” under 
§ 922(g)(1) even if not labeled as a felony.  State misdemeanors are included 
under the statute if punishable by more than two years in prison.58  Further, 
an offense qualifies as a “crime” under § 922(g)(1) based on the maximum 
possible punishment determined by the law, not the individual’s actual 
sentence.59  Additionally, any federal or state offense related to regulation of 
business practices, such as antitrust or unfair trade violations, does not 
qualify as a “crime” under the statute based on a statutory exception.60 
Under § 922(g)(1), a “firearm” is (1) any weapon “which will or is 
designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of 
an explosive,” (2) “the frame or receiver of any such weapon,” (3) a muffler 
or silencer, or (4) any “destructive device.”61  The firearm need not be 
operable, and in fact, qualifies under the statute as long as it was designed to 
fire a projectile.62 
A § 922(g)(1) violation generally is punishable by up to ten years of 
imprisonment and a $250,000 fine.63  In fiscal year 2016,64 for example, the 
average sentence for individuals convicted under § 922(g), including felon-
in-possession violations, was five years.65  The overwhelming majority of 
those sentenced in fiscal year 2016 were male and over half were Black.66 
2.  Statutory Options for Rights Restoration 
Once an individual is convicted of a qualifying offense, the felon-in-
possession prohibition does not expire.67  However, due to “legislative 
grace,” the statute includes certain instances where an individual can have 
their right to possess a firearm restored.68  First, a prior conviction no longer 
 
 57. Joseph O. Anderson, Jr., What “Mens Rea Dilemma”?  A Simple Solution to the 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Circuit Split, 37 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 371, 373 
(2011). 
 58. A “crime” under § 922(g)(1) does not include state misdemeanors “punishable by a 
term of imprisonment of two years or less.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). 
 59. See, e.g., Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(stating that “subject to a maximum possible penalty of” is the correct reading of “punishable 
by” as used in § 921(a)(20)(b)), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847). 
 60. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). 
 61. Id. § 921(a)(3). 
 62. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 668 F.3d 576, 577 (8th Cir. 2012) (noting that proof 
that the firearm is operable is not required by that court or its “sister circuits”). 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). 
 64. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) defined fiscal year 2016 as the period from 
October 1, 2015, to September 30, 2016. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 6, app. A, at 
S-159. 
 65. Quick Facts:  Felon in Possession of a Firearm, supra note 11.  The USSG provided 
information for the statute as a whole, not the particularly subsections such as § 922(g)(1). 
 66. In fiscal year 2016, 96.9 percent of all individuals convicted were male and 51.7 
percent were Black. Id. 
 67. See Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 350 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(stating that there is “no historical support for the view that the passage of time or evidence of 
rehabilitation can restore Second Amendment rights that were forfeited”), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847). 
 68. See id. 
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qualifies as a “crime” under § 922(g)(1) if (1) it was expunged or set aside or 
(2) the individual is pardoned or has his or her civil rights restored.69  There 
is, however, an exception to this exception:  the pardon, expungement, or 
restoration must not expressly state that the individual has not retained the 
right to “ship, transport, possess, or receive” firearms.70 
Second, Congress provided a formalized application process for rights 
restoration under § 925(c), which allows the AG to provide “relief” for 
certain individuals.71  An individual prohibited from firearm possession 
under § 922(g) can request “relief” from the AG by filing an application with 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).72  The 
application must establish that the applicant will not act in a “manner 
dangerous to public safety” nor will the relief be “contrary to the public 
interest.”73  If satisfied by the individual’s showing, the AG is then enabled 
by the statute to grant the relief and restore that individual’s Second 
Amendment rights.74 
In practice, however, this option has not been available for almost thirty 
years because Congress has consistently eliminated funding for this 
restoration process in its yearly appropriations starting in 1992.75  Congress 
justified this funding elimination by explaining in 1992 that the restoration 
process was a “very difficult task” that requires “many hours [spent] 
investigating a particular applicant” and then venturing a “guess” whether he 
or she “can be entrusted with a firearm.”76  The House concluded that the 
“$3.75 million and the 40 man-years annually” is best used for “fighting 
violent crime” instead of “investigating and acting upon these 
applications.”77  It again addressed the funding in 1996 and added that “too 
many” individuals with restored Second Amendment rights “went on to 
 
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2012). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. § 925(c). 
 72. In 2002, the AG was given authority to grant relief pursuant to § 925(c). Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1112(e), 116 Stat. 2135, 2276 (replacing 
“Secretary [of the Treasury]” with “Attorney General” in §§ 921 to 923, 925, and 926).  
Notably, the AG has delegated authority to the ATF to act on § 925(c), among other tasks. 28 
C.F.R. § 0.13(a) (2017). 
 73. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).  
 74. Id. 
 75. See WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44686, GUN CONTROL:  FY2017 
APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES (ATF) 
AND OTHER INITIATIVES 23 (2017) (“For FY1993 and every year thereafter, Congress included 
a proviso in the ATF S&E appropriations language that prevents that agency from using 
appropriations to consider applications for disabilities relief (i.e., reinstatement of an 
applicant’s right to gun ownership) from individuals who are otherwise ineligible to be 
transferred a firearm.”); Is There a Way for a Prohibited Person to Restore His or Her Right 
to Receive or Possess Firearms and Ammunition?, ATF (Nov. 5, 2017), 
https://www.atf.gov/firearms/qa/there-way-prohibited-person-restore-his-or-her-right-
receive-or-possess-firearms-and [https://perma.cc/MM8X-BG37]. 
 76. H.R. REP. NO. 102-618, at 14 (1992). 
 77. Id. 
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commit violent crimes with firearms.”78  This prohibition on funding has 
meant that applications for relief under § 925(c) “cannot be acted upon.”79 
Despite “legislative grace” only providing pardons, expungement, or the 
defunded application process, individuals have turned to courts post-Heller 
to restore their Second Amendment rights in as-applied challenges to 
§ 922(g)(1).80 
B.  Heller and McDonald:  Chaos Created 
In 2008, the Court undertook its first “in-depth examination of the Second 
Amendment” in Heller.81  There, Dick Heller challenged82 a thirty-two-year-
old District of Columbia (D.C.) law banning handgun possession.83  In a 5 to 
4 decision, the Court held that the D.C. handgun ban violated the individual’s 
right to defend one’s home and that this right is at the Second Amendment’s 
“core.”84  With self-defense at the Second Amendment’s core, the Court 
stated that certain policy issues, including an absolute handgun ban in the 
home, are not permissible.85  The Court based its decision on a statutory and 
historical analysis of the Second Amendment.86 
This Note does not assert an opinion on the Court’s analysis in Heller and 
instead focuses on what the decision lacks.  The Court acknowledges that 
Heller is incomplete, noting that it does not “clarify the entire field” nor 
provide “utter certainty” for Second Amendment jurisprudence just as its first 
in-depth case concerning the Free Exercise Clause did not clarify all of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.87 
Three portions of Heller are so vague that they have caused pervasive 
disagreement in the circuits.  The first issue arises in the Court’s deferral of 
a complete analysis of Second Amendment jurisprudence on the ground that 
“there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications” for 
evaluating other firearm regulations.88  Without providing guidance on how 
to evaluate firearm regulations, Heller left the “formidable task of defining 
the scope of permissible regulations” to the lower courts.89  Federal courts 
 
 78. H.R. REP. NO. 104-183, at 15 (1994). 
 79. Is There a Way for a Prohibited Person to Restore His or Her Right to Receive or 
Possess Firearms and Ammunition?, supra note 75; see also United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 
71, 75–76 (2002) (stating that inaction by the ATF on § 925(c) applications “does not invest 
a district court with independent jurisdiction to act on an application”). 
 80. See Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 9. 
 81. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 82. Id. at 575. 
 83. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 942 (4th ed. 
2011). 
 84. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 
767–68 (2010) (summarizing the Court’s analysis of the Second Amendment in Heller). 
 85. Heller, 554 U.S. at 602. 
 86. See id. at 576–627. 
 87. See id. at 635 (“[O]ne should not expect [Heller] to clarify the entire field [of Second 
Amendment jurisprudence], any more than . . . [the Court’s] first in-depth Free Exercise 
Clause case . . . left that area in a state of utter certainty.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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have tried to undertake this task, in part, by focusing on the phrase “historical 
justifications,” believing it provided a clue into how the Court would 
eventually evaluate other firearms regulations.90 
Heller’s second problem is that it does not explicitly declare which 
standard of constitutional scrutiny to use when evaluating a Second 
Amendment challenge.91  Such guidance is important because the three 
standards result in different levels of review and deference.92  The rational 
basis test provides the greatest level of judicial deference and results in a law 
being upheld if it is “rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”93  
Under the rational basis test, the challenger must prove that the law does not 
serve any conceivable legitimate purpose or is not a reasonable way to 
achieve that end.94  The next analytical tier is intermediate scrutiny, which 
asks if the law is “substantially related to an important government 
purpose.”95  Strict scrutiny is the most exacting level of review, which only 
allows a law to be upheld if “it is necessary to achieve a compelling 
government purpose.”96  Here, the government must show that the law is the 
“least restrictive or least discriminatory alternative” to meet the necessary 
interest.97  As this suggests, strict scrutiny is a difficult test to surmount, 
resulting in many laws examined under this test being deemed 
unconstitutional.98  Not surprisingly, the standard chosen to evaluate the 
constitutionality of a law is likely outcome determinative—meaning the law 
is likely to be upheld under rational basis and likely not under strict 
scrutiny.99 
In Heller, the Court held that the D.C. handgun ban failed constitutional 
muster “under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to 
enumerated constitutional rights.”100  However, this reference to “any” 
standard of scrutiny was particularly concerning to Justice Breyer, who 
devoted the third part of his dissent to a lack of guidance on the standards of 
scrutiny.101  Breyer rejected the Court’s assertion that the D.C. law would be 
 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Heller does not 
catalogue the facts we must consider when reviewing a felon’s as-applied challenge.  Rather, 
the Supreme Court has noted that it will ‘expound upon the historical justifications for 
exceptions [it] mentioned if and when those exceptions come before [it].’  Thus, to evaluate 
Barton’s as-applied challenge, we look to the historical pedigree of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). . . .” 
(first and second alterations in original) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635)); see also infra Part 
III.C. 
 91. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (stating that the D.C. handgun ban would “fail 
constitutional muster” under “any of the standards of scrutiny”). 
 92. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 93. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 83, at 552–53. 
 94. See id.  
 95. Id. at 553. 
 96. Id. at 554. 
 97. Id.  
 98. See id. (“Strict scrutiny, of course, is the most intensive type of judicial review, and 
laws generally are declared unconstitutional when it is applied.  Professor Gerald Gunther said 
that it is ‘strict in theory and fatal in fact.’”). 
 99. See id. 
 100. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). 
 101. See id. at 687–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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unconstitutional under any standard, pointing first to the law’s “‘legitimate’ 
life-saving objective” as enough to survive the rational basis test.102  Breyer 
next stated that strict scrutiny cannot be adopted because if it were, the 
constitutionality of many longstanding prohibitions—including “forfeiture 
by criminals of the Second Amendment right”—would be “far from clear.”103  
Breyer ultimately suggested an interest balancing test,104 which the Court 
rejected.105  The Court did, however, agree with Breyer’s concerns, stating 
in footnote twenty-seven that rational basis analysis is not the proper 
standard.106  In fact, the Court noted that under rational basis, the Second 
Amendment would be ineffective and “redundant with the separate 
constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws.”107  Beyond that, the Court did 
not elaborate beyond stating that something more than rational basis is 
required.108  Thus, federal courts in post-Heller challenges have largely 
settled on intermediate scrutiny since strict scrutiny and rational basis were 
questioned by Justice Breyer and the Court respectively.109 
A third example of important yet unsubstantiated language in Heller—
which is perhaps the most significant for this Note—is a footnote that states 
that certain longstanding prohibitions on firearms, including § 922(g)(1), are 
“presumptively lawful”110 infringements on an individual’s Second 
Amendment rights.111  As noted, Justice Breyer cited examples of the laws 
that the Court had noted would be permissible—the same regulations called 
“presumptively lawful”112—as proof that the standard of review cannot be 
strict scrutiny.113  Additionally, the Court stated that the laws that prohibit 
possession of certain weapons, such as sawed-off shotguns, are 
permissible.114  These presumptively lawful prohibitions are affirmed again 
in the final paragraphs of the decision, which stated that D.C. must permit 
Heller to register his handgun and keep it in his home “assuming that [he] is 
not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights.”115  Yet, as 
Breyer noted, the Court did not provide reasons or justifications as to why 
 
 102. Id. at 687–88. 
 103. Id. at 688. 
 104. See id. at 689. 
 105. See id. at 634–35 (majority opinion). 
 106. See id. at 628 n.27. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 6. 
 110. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
 111. Id. at 626–27 (stating that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons”); see also United States v. 
Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause Heller requires that we ‘presume,’ under 
most circumstances, that felon dispossession statutes regulate conduct which is unprotected 
by the Second Amendment, Barton’s facial challenge [to § 922(g)(1)] must fail.”). 
 112. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26. 
 113. Id. at 688–89 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 114. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (upholding a law prohibiting 
the possession of sawed-off shotguns). 
 115. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (majority opinion). 
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these “presumptively lawful” provisions would survive Second Amendment 
scrutiny.116 
Two years after Heller, the Court held in McDonald that the Second 
Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, 
applies to state and local governments.117  The Court stated that its decisions 
in Heller and McDonald do not “imperil every law regulating firearms” or 
suggest that the Second Amendment is absolute, again noting the list of 
presumptively lawful prohibitions articulated in Heller.118  However, the 
Court again failed to establish why these presumptively lawful regulations 
are permissible, with Justice Breyer again asking, “but why these rules and 
not others?”119 
C.  Presumptively Lawful:  Facial Challenges to § 922(g)(1) 
In his Heller dissent, Justice Stevens lamented the Court’s “announcement 
of a new constitutional right,” which “upsets [the] settled understanding” of 
Second Amendment jurisprudence while “leav[ing] for future cases the 
formidable task of defining the scope of permissible regulations.”120  As 
Stevens warned, “two ‘waves’ of litigations” followed Heller and McDonald 
that questioned “settled” laws.121 
This Part examines how courts undertook the “formidable” task of 
addressing the “waves” of Second Amendment challenges.  Part I.C.1 looks 
at the first wave of post-Heller litigation of facial challenges to longstanding 
prohibitions like § 922(g)(1), particularly in the Third Circuit.  Part I.C.2 then 
analyzes the Third Circuit’s decision in Binderup, the first successful as-
applied challenge to § 922(g)(1).  This Part also highlights the pervasive 
disagreement among the circuits about as-applied challenges to the statute. 
1.  Casting No Doubt:  Unsuccessful Facial Challenges 
The first wave of litigation post-Heller dealt primarily with facial 
challenges to sections of the Gun Control Act of 1968, including 
§ 922(g)(1).122  As noted, federal courts had little guidance from the Court 
on how to evaluate these challenges.123  The Third Circuit is credited with 
creating the two-prong test in Marzzarella that has been largely used by 
courts to analyze challenged firearm regulations and was later applied to 
 
 116. Id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that he was “puzzled” about the justifications 
for the Court’s presumptively lawful prohibitions). 
 117. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). 
 118. Id. at 786. 
 119. Id. at 925 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 120. Heller, 554 U.S. at 679 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 121. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 4. 
 122. See id. at 4–8. 
 123. See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Heller does not 
catalogue the facts we must consider when reviewing a felon’s as-applied challenge.”); United 
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 2010) (“But Heller did not purport to fully 
define all the contours of the Second Amendment . . . and accordingly, much of the scope of 
the right remains unsettled.”); see also supra Part I.B. 
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challenges to § 922(g)(1).124  The Third Circuit ultimately upheld 
Marzzarella’s § 922(k) conviction,125 which prohibits knowingly 
transporting, receiving, selling, or possessing any firearm with its serial 
number removed or altered.126  The Third Circuit created its test for Second 
Amendment challenges by largely adopting tests similar to those used to 
determine free speech issues under the First Amendment.127  It held that 
Heller suggested a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges 
by (1) asking whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct that 
falls within the Second Amendment’s scope, and if so, (2) evaluating it under 
“some form of means-end scrutiny.”128 
The first prong of the Marzzarella test deals with the scope of the Second 
Amendment.  Looking to historical justification of the law based on the 
language of Heller,129 the Third Circuit first asked whether possession of an 
“unmarked” firearm in the home—which is prohibited by § 922(k)—is 
protected by the Second Amendment.130  While noting the assertions in 
Heller and McDonald that the Second Amendment’s rights are not unlimited, 
the Third Circuit stated that the Second Amendment protects “the right of 
law-abiding citizens to possess non-dangerous weapons for self-defense in 
the home.”131  However, the Third Circuit held that unmarked firearms are 
possibly included under the lawful prohibition on dangerous and unusual 
weapons132 after comparing the law’s historical justifications to those 
presumptively lawful prohibitions named in Heller.133  The Third Circuit 
found it difficult to make a final determination on whether possessing an 
unmarked firearm is protected by the Second Amendment,134 citing the lack 
of guidance from Heller.135  Therefore, the Third Circuit stated that it could 
not be certain whether possession of an unmarked firearm is protected and 
proceeded to analyze the law under the second prong.136 
The test’s second prong requires an analysis of the challenged law under a 
level of scrutiny.  Citing the absence of a prescribed standard in Heller, the 
Third Circuit struggled to determine what level of scrutiny to use.137  It first 
rejected the rational basis test based on footnote twenty-seven of Heller, 
which indicates that a higher scrutiny than rational basis is required for a 
 
 124. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 125. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 87. 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2012). 
 127. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 n.4. 
 128. Id. at 89. 
 129. See id. at 92. 
 130. See id. at 89. 
 131. Id. at 92. 
 132. See id. at 95 (“Because a firearm with a serial number is equally effective as a firearm 
without one, there would appear to be no compelling reason why a law-abiding citizen would 
prefer an unmarked firearm.”). 
 133. Id. at 93 (“Section 922(k)’s prohibition of the possession of firearms with ‘removed, 
obliterated, or altered’ serial numbers is one of those regulations unmentioned by Heller.”). 
 134. Id. at 94 (stating that it is possible that “Marzzarella’s conduct may still fall within the 
Second Amendment”). 
 135. Id. at 92. 
 136. Id. at 95. 
 137. See id. at 95–97. 
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Second Amendment challenge.138  It also rejected Marzzarella’s argument 
that it should use strict scrutiny since the Second Amendment is a 
fundamental constitutional right.139  Conceding that strict scrutiny likely 
applies in some Second Amendment challenges, the Third Circuit looked to 
First Amendment doctrine and explained that strict scrutiny does not 
necessarily “apply automatically any time an enumerated right is 
involved.”140  To underscore this point, the court cited examples of speech 
for which different levels of scrutiny apply.141  Since the right to free speech 
is an “undeniably enumerated fundamental right” that is “susceptible to 
several standards of scrutiny, depending upon the type of law challenged and 
the type of speech at issue,” the court found “no reason why the Second 
Amendment would be any different.”142  The court’s reluctance to employ 
this analysis is clear, particularly in footnote fifteen, where it noted that the 
First Amendment is a useful tool but that a Second Amendment analysis 
could differ.143 
The Third Circuit compared the limited prohibition of § 922(k) to the 
absolute prohibition from the D.C. handgun ban in Heller to establish that 
§ 922(k) does not come close to the D.C. law’s “level of infringement” since 
§ 922(k) allows for a person to possess any other lawful firearm as long as it 
bears its original serial number.144  Because of its limited impact, the Third 
Circuit believed that the law is a regulation rather than a prohibition; the court 
would, therefore, evaluate it less stringently than the D.C. handgun ban in 
Heller.145  Thus, the court ultimately settled on evaluating § 922(k) with 
intermediate scrutiny, though it was “not free from doubt” about its 
decision.146  Notably, it was so unsure of its decision to apply intermediate 
scrutiny that it also applied strict scrutiny,147 which illustrates the judicial 
confusion caused by Heller’s vague standards.  The Third Circuit looked to 
the historical justification and the legislative intent of the prohibition to find 
that § 922(k) passed constitutional muster.148 
One year later, in United States v. Barton,149 the Third Circuit heard a 
challenge to § 922(g)(1).150  Unlike the law evaluated in Marzzarella,151 the 
challenged statute in Barton was expressly enumerated as a “presumptively 
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exceptions to novel regulations unmentioned by Heller.”). 
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lawful” regulation in Heller and McDonald.152  As noted, the assertion of 
“presumptive lawfulness” was not substantiated in Heller or McDonald.153  
Agreeing with the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits,154 the Third Circuit held that 
the “presumptive lawfulness” of § 922(g)(1) is not dicta.155  Because the 
Heller decision was “made expressly contingent upon a determination that 
Heller was not ‘disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment 
rights,’”156 the Third Circuit held that the “presumptively lawful” language 
was outcome determinative and thus not mere dicta.157  Therefore, the court 
denied the facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) based on Heller’s assertion that the 
federal courts “presume” that felon-in-possession prohibitions are valid 
under the Second Amendment.158 
The Third Circuit is not alone in holding that § 922(g)(1), on its face, 
passes constitutional muster.  In fact, ten other circuits have directly 
addressed this question and all have upheld the statute’s constitutionality.159  
Additionally, most circuits have adopted some variation of the Marzzarella 
two-prong test when evaluating Second Amendment challenges.160  The 
nature and process of the test varies among the circuits, however.161  For the 
first step, some circuits use historical analysis to determine whether the 
regulated conduct was within the scope of conduct anticipated by the 
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 153. See supra notes 109–18 and accompanying text. 
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Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1114–15; United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 
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United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 23–24 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 160. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 & n.49 (2d Cir. 
2015); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. 
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Founders,162 while others hold that “exclusions” from the Second 
Amendment scope “need not mirror limits that were on the books in 1791.”163  
Most circuits have “preferred to assume” that the challenged laws deal with 
conduct that is possibly protected by the Second Amendment, likely out of 
caution based on Heller’s failure to “explain precisely the nature of [the] 
conduct that fell within” the Second Amendment’s scope.164  Thus, 
regardless of its belief that the law may deal with unprotected conduct, most 
circuits proceed to step two, where they evaluate the law under a standard of 
scrutiny.165  Like the Third Circuit, most circuits have applied intermediate 
scrutiny at this step, except for “rare” occasions when a different standard 
was used.166 
2.  Binderup:  A Successful As-Applied Challenge  
As previously noted, Second Amendment challenges have come in two 
“‘waves’ of litigation.”167  The first wave dealt primarily with facial 
challenges to firearm regulations brought by individuals charged, including 
unsuccessful challenges to § 922(g)(1).168  The second wave has dealt with 
as-applied challenges to firearm regulations, typically arising in civil actions 
brought by individuals seeking to have their Second Amendment rights 
restored.169  An as-applied challenge “does not contend that a law is 
unconstitutional as written but that its application to a particular person under 
particular circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right.”170 
To better understand as-applied challenges, this Note briefly addresses the 
manner in which regulations prohibit firearm possession.  The Court in Heller 
recognized at least two ways regulations can prohibit firearm possession:  
(1) on “who” and (2) on “what.”171  In other words, the Court recognized the 
longstanding limitations on possession by individuals convicted of felonies, 
deemed mentally ill, or in sensitive places like schools—the “who”—and on 
“dangerous and unusual weapons”—the “what.”172 
The handgun ban invalidated in Heller dealt with the reason the right was 
to be exercised, where the court ultimately found a fundamental right to 
defend one’s home.173  In Barton, the defendant argued that his “for what 
 
 162. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 200–03; United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8, 
15-16 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 163. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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85, 101 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e hesitate to say Marzzarella’s possession of an unmarked firearm 
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 170. United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 171. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008); see also Barton, 633 
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 172. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 173. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 175. 
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reason” challenge overcame his “who” prohibition; in other words, he argued 
that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it stops him from exercising the 
right to defend his home.174  However, the Third Circuit rejected this and 
foreclosed any “for what reason” challenges by an individual who qualifies 
for a “who” prohibition.175   
Other circuits have also held that the first question to be asked in as-applied 
challenges is “whether one is qualified to possess a firearm,” not the 
individual’s reason for possessing the firearm.176  Thus, to mount a successful 
as-applied challenge, an individual must show why the “who” prohibition 
does not apply by “adequately distinguish[ing] [her or] his circumstances 
from those of persons historically excluded from Second Amendment 
protections.”177  In other words, in as-applied challenges, courts look to the 
“particular circumstances” that would remove the specific challenging 
individual from a statute’s “constitutional sweep.”178 
As-applied challenges in the second wave of post-Heller litigation have 
“[i]ronically”—as noted by the DOJ—been most successful when 
challenging the statutes that the Heller Court considered presumptively 
lawful, including the felon-in-possession prohibition.179  Though upholding 
these prohibitions on their face, the Third Circuit in Barton stated that these 
prohibitions, which were deemed “presumptively lawful,” seem to imply that 
“the presumption may be rebutted” and thus not foreclosing as-applied 
challenges.180 
In Binderup, the Third Circuit became the first circuit—in a fractured 
decision181—to restore the Second Amendment rights to two individuals in 
as-applied challenges to an otherwise constitutional Second Amendment 
prohibition.182  The two individuals—Daniel Binderup and Julio Suarez—
filed separate complaints in federal district courts arguing that § 922(g)(1) 
did not apply to their convictions, and even if it did,  that it was 
unconstitutional as applied to them.183  The district courts found that 
 
 174. See id. at 174. 
 175. Id. at 175 (“Heller forecloses any as-applied challenge based on the manner in which 
a felon wishes to exercise his Second Amendment rights.”).   
 176. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also 
United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 177. Binderup v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 16-847). 
 178. Id. at 346. 
 179. Reiss & Anderson, supra note 5, at 9 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 
570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008)). 
 180. Barton, 633 F.3d at 173 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26). 
 181. See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 339 n.1 (“Parts III.A–C.3.a preserve the Marzzarella 
framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges and overrule aspects of Barton that 
are inconsistent with it.  Seven Judges join those Parts expressly.  Chief Judge McKee and 
Judges Shwartz and Restrepo, who join Judge Fuentes’s opinion, agree that Marzzarella 
controls the Second Amendment analysis, but do not join any of Part III because they reject 
the notion that the Marzzarella framework can be reconciled with any aspect of Barton’s as-
applied Second Amendment analysis, which they would overrule entirely.”). 
 182. See id. at 339, 379–80. 
 183. Id. at 340.  Binderup filed his complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and 
Suarez filed his complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Id. 
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§ 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as applied but used different methods to 
support their rulings.184  The government appealed and the Third Circuit sua 
sponte consolidated the cases for a hearing en banc.185  The Third Circuit 
unanimously rejected Binderup and Suarez’s argument that their predicate 
offenses—state misdemeanors—did not qualify as crimes for § 922(g)(1) 
purposes.186  It noted that both predicate offenses are subject to a maximum 
possible penalty exceeding one year and, thus, qualify as a “crime” for the 
felon-in-possession prohibition.187  More important here, the Third Circuit 
then established how an individual otherwise prohibited from firearm 
possession can “rebut the presumption that [she or] he lacks Second 
Amendment rights.”188  A majority of the Third Circuit agreed that 
Marzzarella’s two-prong test should be used to guide the analysis, while a 
separate majority agreed about what factors constitute each prong.189 
Characterizing the Third Circuit in Binderup as fractured is an 
understatement.  First, only a slight majority concurred in judgment.190  Of 
the fifteen judges, eight decided that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional as 
applied to Binderup and Suarez.191  The remaining seven judges believed that 
§ 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied and further challenged the very 
premise that as-applied challenges to the longstanding “presumptively 
lawful” prohibitions, like § 922(g)(1), are even permissible.192  Second, there 
was a split among the eight judges that upheld the as-applied challenge.  Only 
three judges who upheld the as-applied challenge agreed that a determination 
of an offense’s seriousness dictates whether the challenge is successful, while 
the other five believed that the determination should depend upon the 
existence of “violence.”193  Third, the judges were further split by what test 
to use in determining Second Amendment challenges.  Seven judges held that 
the framework for deciding as-applied challenges came from reading 
Marzzarella and Barton together,194 four judges held that Barton alone 
should be used,195 and the remaining three judges would have only used 
Marzzarella.196  It is not surprising, then, that Judge Julio Fuentes, who 
authored the dissent in judgment,197 warned that this fractured decision 
 
 184. See id. at 340–41. 
 185. See id. at 341. 
 186. Pursuant to § 922(g)(1), a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year” does not include “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a 
misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 921(a)(20)(b) (2012).  
 187. See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 342. 
 188. Id. at 339. 
 189. See id. at 339 & n.1. 
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 191. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Sessions v. Binderup, 137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017) (No. 
16-847). 
 192. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 380, 401–07; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 
191, at 8. 
 193. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 356; id. at 357 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part). 
 194. See id. at 346–47 (majority opinion). 
 195. See id. at 365–66 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part). 
 196. See id. at 339 n.1 (majority opinion); supra note 181. 
 197. See id. at 380 (Fuentes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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lacked “any workable standards that would make such a regime 
administratively feasible or doctrinally coherent” for district courts going 
forward.198 
Binderup contains three written opinions:  (1) the opinion of the court 
advocating a broad test, written by Judge Thomas L. Ambro, (2) a concurring 
opinion advocating a narrower test written by Judge Thomas Hardiman, and 
(3) a dissenting in judgment opinion, written by Judge Fuentes.199  The 
Ambro opinion held that the framework for as-applied Second Amendment 
challenges came from a collective reading of Marzzarella and Barton200 and 
noted that any aspects of Barton that conflicted with Marzzarella were 
overruled.201  In other words, the Third Circuit upheld Marzzarella’s two-
prong test, with step one supplemented by the hurdles provided by Barton.202  
At step one, the challenging individual must prove that the “presumptively 
lawful regulation burdens his [or her] Second Amendment rights,” which 
requires him or her to:  (1) “identify the traditional justification for 
excluding . . . the class of which he [or she] appears to be a member” from 
Second Amendment protections and (2) “present facts about himself [or 
herself] and his [or her] background that distinguish his [or her] 
circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred class.”203  
Here, the challenger must “rebut the presumptive lawfulness of the 
exclusion,” which Ambro declared “no small task” and not “merely on [the 
challenger’s] say-so.”204 
Ambro defined § 922(g)(1)’s “historically barred class” as individuals 
previously convicted of serious crimes.205  Looking to historical justification 
for § 922(g)(1), Ambro found that the prohibition is “tied to the concept of a 
virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm 
‘unvirtuous citizens,’” which is “broader than violent criminals.”206  This 
analysis was a break from Barton, which stated in a footnote that § 922(g)(1) 
was meant to prohibit “criminals likely to commit a violent crime in the 
future.”207  Ambro stated that this footnote from Barton “too narrowly” 
defined § 922(g)(1)’s justification, which resulted in it “too broadly” defining 
the class of potentially successful as-applied challenges to individuals 
convicted of nonviolent crimes.208  Further, Ambro ruled against Barton’s 
assertion that evidence of rehabilitation or likelihood of recidivism could be 
used at step one and noted the difficulty in predicting whether an individual 
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 199. See id. at 336–39 (majority opinion).  For convenience, each of these opinions will be 
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 200. See id. at 346–47. 
 201. See id. at 339 n.1. 
 202. See id. at 347. 
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 204. Id. at 347. 
 205. Id. at 348–49. 
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 207. Id. at 347 n.3. 
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is likely to commit a violent offense in the future.209  Therefore, the first step 
is entirely an analysis of the “seriousness of the purportedly disqualifying 
offense,” without focusing on the violence associated with that offense or a 
consideration of the individual’s rehabilitation.210 
The opinion does not cover how to determine “seriousness.”  Instead, 
Ambro provided a number of possible factors to consider that are sufficient, 
but not necessary, such as maximum possible punishment,211 whether the 
legislators enacted the offense as a misdemeanor,212 the use or attempted use 
of force as an element,213 the length of the challenger’s sentence,214 and 
whether other states “consider” the offense to be serious.215  If a court finds 
that the predicate offense is not serious, then the individual “adequately 
distinguished his circumstances from those of persons historically excluded 
from Second Amendment protections.”216  The law is then evaluated under 
“heightened scrutiny at step two,”217 settling on intermediate scrutiny.218 
Hardiman—joined by four judges—agreed that § 922(g)(1) was 
unconstitutional as applied to Binderup and Suarez.219  However, Hardiman 
argues that Barton was correct in determining that the historical justification 
for § 922(g)(1) was “tethered to the time-honored practice of keeping 
firearms out of the hands of those likely to commit violent crimes.”220  As 
such, Hardiman believed that § 922(g)(1) was “categorically 
unconstitutional” when applied to “non-dangerous persons convicted of 
offenses unassociated with violence” because it “eviscerates the core of 
the[ir] Second Amendment right.”221  Therefore, Hardiman differed from 
Ambro by asserting that challengers must distinguish themselves from those 
with a “propensity for violence,” who were the historical target of the felon-
in-possession prohibition.222  He argued that step one should, thus, largely 
look at whether the predicate offense involved “violence, force, or threat of 
force,”223 in addition to considering the individual’s subsequent behavior 
since the offense, which could affirm or disprove his or her “membership 
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among the class of responsible, law-abiding citizens” with Second 
Amendment rights.224 
In his dissent, Fuentes—joined by six other judges—questioned the 
premise that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are permissible and argued 
that if permissible, Binderup or Suarez would not qualify.225  Fuentes began 
his analysis by looking at how other circuits have applied the Court’s “limited 
guidance” from Heller to challenges of felon-in-possession prohibitions.226  
No other circuit had upheld an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) and, in 
fact, four circuits had found them to be impermissible.227 
After providing the status of as-applied challenges among the sister 
circuits, Fuentes concurred with Ambro about using the Marzzarella test and 
analyzing a crime’s “seriousness” at step one.228  However, Fuentes stated 
that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) would fail at step one of the test 
because all “crimes currently within § 922(g)(1)’s scope are serious by 
definition.”229  Fuentes noted that Congress has the power to require 
individuals convicted of crimes to “forfeit any number of rights and 
privileges” and that the prohibition on firearm possession is “a consequence 
of [the individuals’] own unlawful conduct.”230  Fuentes also stated that even 
if as-applied challenges could be permitted for some firearm regulations, 
there can be laws where “such challenges must fail in the face of reasonable 
deference to legislative judgments,” pointing to First Amendment 
jurisprudence.231  Referring to United Public Workers of America v. 
Mitchell,232 Fuentes pointed out that Congress does indeed have the power 
to “impose a complete ban on the exercise of a constitutional right by a 
category of persons who, in its reasonable estimation, pose a threat to the 
public,” thus supporting the complete ban on firearm possession for 
individuals convicted of felonies.233 
Fuentes further opined that the problems with as-applied challenges are 
insurmountable because any bright-line analysis is “practically impossible” 
and the determination cannot be made “with any degree of confidence.”234  
To illustrate this, Fuentes pointed to Congress’s decision to defund the AG’s 
administrative regime for providing individualized exceptions to the 
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prohibitions allowed under § 925(c).235  Fuentes highlighted Congress’s 
evaluation of “evidence from its prior regime” that these individual 
evaluations—which were “in effect, as-applied challenges”—were 
“unworkable.”236  Specifically, he cited a 1992 Senate report, which stated 
that the system was “too prone to error” and could result in “devastating 
consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made.”237  
Fuentes concluded that Congress’s decision to defund the application process 
shows that as-applied challenges are untenable due to the possibility of 
“potentially fatal” errors.238 
Additionally, Fuentes pointed to a number of federal court cases brought 
after Congress stopped funding § 925(c),239 including United States v. 
Bean.240  In Bean, the Supreme Court held that the federal courts were not 
forced to review the individual applications after Congress ceased funding 
such review.241  In its analysis, the Court stated that “an inquiry into that 
applicant’s background” is “best performed by the Executive” because an 
agency, “unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for conducting a neutral, 
wide-ranging investigation.”242  Noting that this decision was pre-Heller,243 
Fuentes nonetheless implored the Third Circuit to heed Bean’s warnings of 
“pitfalls inherent in a regime of as-applied challenges.”244 
Fuentes’s most significant—and concluding—concern echoed Justices 
Stevens and Breyer in their Heller and McDonald dissents.  Fuentes warned 
that this decision will “saddle district court judges”245 with an “extraordinary 
administrative burden”246 without providing any “workable standards” for 
determining an as-applied challenge’s constitutionality.247  Echoing the 
Court in Heller, the Third Circuit leaves it to “future cases to explain more 
fully how to weigh and balance” factors in the Binderup test.248  Fuentes 
warned that “it will only be a matter of time before void-for-vagueness 
challenges to § 922(g)(1) start to percolate throughout” the Third Circuit.249  
Thus, in addition to concerns over the permissibility of as-applied challenges, 
Fuentes expressed concern about the test itself. 
 
 235. Id. at 402–03; see also Part I.A.2. 
 236. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 403. 
 237. Id.  The House Report echoes similar concerns. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-618, at 14 
(1992). 
 238. Binderup, 836 F.3d at 403. 
 239. See id. at 407–09. 
 240. 537 U.S. 71 (2002). 
 241. Id. at 77–78. 
 242. Id. at 77. 
 243. See Binderup, 836 F.3d at 408 n.209. 
 244. Id. at 408. 
 245. Id. at 380. 
 246. Id. at 409. 
 247. Id. at 380. 
 248. Id. at 411. 
 249. Id. 
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II.  UNCONSTITUTIONAL INVALIDITY:  JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES 
Fuentes’s warning of void-for-vagueness challenges alluded to 
Johnson,250 which settled a pervasive disagreement among the circuits 
concerning the residual clause of the ACCA.251  That disagreement is similar 
to the issues present in the as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), including 
Binderup.  Part II.A provides a brief overview of the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine.  Part II.B analyzes Johnson with a focus on the similarities between 
the Court’s issues with the residual clause and those with as-applied 
challenges. 
A.  Void for Vagueness:  Overview 
Primarily used in First Amendment challenges, the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine has been described by the Court as assessing whether a statute 
“forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague” that it necessitates 
a “guess at its meaning and differ[s] as to its application.”252  The Court has 
only used the doctrine to invalidate a criminal law five times since the 
1960s.253  The fifth and most recent is Johnson.  Applying the void-for-
vagueness doctrine in Johnson, the Court explained that a criminal law is 
unconstitutional if it is “so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair 
notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary 
enforcement.”254  Ambiguity in criminal law, particularly if it does not 
provide minimal guidelines for enforcement, can result in unjust punishment 
and selective prosecution.255 
B.  Johnson v. United States 
In Johnson, the Court held that the residual clause of the ACCA—called 
by a federal public defender as “the most contentious 14 words in a criminal 
statute in recent years”—was unconstitutionally vague.256  The ACCA, 
which the DOJ called a longstanding tool to “achieve prolonged incarceration 
of armed violent offenders,”257 increases the penalties for individuals 
convicted under § 922(g)(1) if they have had three or more earlier convictions 
for “serious drug offense[s]” or “violent felon[ies].”258 
Under the ACCA, a predicate offense qualifies as a “violent felony” if it 
(1) falls within an element clause, which means it “has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another”;259 (2) “is burglary, arson, extortion, or an offense involving the use 
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of explosives”;260 or (3) falls within the residual clause, which includes any 
felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk 
of physical injury to another.”261 
Should the predicate offenses qualify under the ACCA, there is a 
mandatory increase from a ten-year maximum sentence under § 922(g)(1) to 
a fifteen-year minimum sentence and a maximum sentence of life,262 even if 
the judge finds the resulting sentence unjust or excessive.263  In fiscal year 
2016, 305 individuals received an ACCA enhancement and their average 
sentence was fifteen years;264 this was ten years more than the average 
sentence for a § 922(g)(1) violation.265  Thus, the determination of a “serious 
drug offense” or a “violent felony” is significant. 
Prior to Johnson, the Court had undertaken multiple examinations of the 
ACCA, including in Taylor v. United States.266  In Taylor, the Court 
addressed whether a particular state conviction for burglary qualified as a 
“burglary” pursuant to the ACCA.267  To determine if a predicate offense 
qualifies under the ACCA, the Court endorsed the categorical approach, 
whereby courts look to the predicate offense’s statutory elements as opposed 
to the particular individual’s conduct underlying the conviction.268  Taylor, 
thus, rejected “mini-trials” where sentencing judges undergo a fact-specific 
analysis for each individual.269  This element-specific categorical approach 
was to be used in assessing predicate offenses for the ACCA, including under 
the residual clause.270 
The Court also dealt specifically with the residual clause before Johnson, 
granting certiorari in four cases from 2007 to 2015.271  In each case, the Court 
addressed the inclusion of different predicate offenses under the residual 
clause and applied a slightly different test each time.272  Another feature of 
these four cases was the repeated objections of Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Alito over the lack of clarity and consistency in the residual clause analysis 
and the Court’s previous decisions.273 
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Ultimately, in 2015, the Court invalidated the residual clause in Johnson 
in an opinion written, unsurprisingly, by Justice Scalia.274  The Court held 
that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause was 
unconstitutional because of the “indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry” 
required to determine if a predicate offense qualified as a “violent felony” 
under the clause.275  In particular, the Court identified two features of the 
residual clause that “conspire to make it unconstitutionally vague.”276  First, 
the categorical approach required that courts use a “judicially imagined 
‘ordinary case’” to estimate the risk of the crime instead of “real-world facts 
or statutory elements.”277  The Court expressed deep concern with the “grave 
uncertainty” about how the judges would estimate the risk of the crime, 
asking—perhaps sarcastically—if the judge should look to “statistical 
analysis,” “a survey,” “expert evidence,” “Google,” or “gut instinct.”278  
Second, the courts ask if the “judge-imagined abstraction” of the ordinary 
crime involved “serious potential risk,” which was an equally vague 
notion.279  The Court held that these two features conspire to create “arbitrary 
enforcement by judges.”280  Taken together, the Court held that the 
application of the residual clause to enhance one’s sentence denied due 
process.281 
The Court was not persuaded that the residual clause was constitutional 
merely because there are “straightforward cases” in which a predicate offense 
“clearly pose[s] a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”282  
Pointing to precedent, the Court rejected the argument that a statute is 
constitutional “merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within 
the provision’s grasp.”283  The Court did not accept that “some obviously 
risky crimes” establish that the residual clause is constitutional.284  Further, 
the Court rejected the government’s argument that courts should look to the 
individual’s conduct rather than employ the categorical approach.285  The 
Court affirmed the importance of Taylor and noted the “utter impracticability 
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of requiring” a court to “reconstruct” an individual’s conduct “long after the 
original conviction.”286  Ultimately, the residual clause was doomed by the 
need to apply two vague standards—“serious potential risk” and “idealized 
ordinary case”—that the Court found resulted in “arbitrary enforcement.”287 
The Court acknowledged its multiple past attempts to establish a standard 
test for the residual clause and cited these “persistent efforts” as proof of 
vagueness.288  Pointing to inconsistencies and splits among the lower federal 
courts, the Court highlighted that “pervasive disagreement” in the lower court 
about “the nature of the inquiry one is supposed to conduct and the kinds of 
factors one is supposed to consider.”289  The Court called the general 
confusion and lack of consistency unavoidable and inconsistent with due 
process:  “Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison 
for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee of due 
process.”290 
III.  ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY 
OF THE BINDERUP TEST 
A decade after Heller, the Court has yet to “clarify the entire field” of 
Second Amendment jurisprudence or “expound upon the historical 
justifications” for the “presumptively lawful” prohibitions—as it said it 
would.291  Two particular areas of concern have arisen as federal courts seek 
to respond to the post-Heller challenges:  (1) the permissibility of as-applied 
challenges to the enumerated presumptively lawful prohibitions and (2) the 
constitutionality of the tests created by the circuits to respond to challenges.  
Part III.A addresses the permissibility of as-applied challenges, while Part 
III.B highlights the Binderup test to show constitutional concerns with the 
current state of as-applied challenges. 
A.  Are As-Applied Challenges Permissible? 
As noted, the Court in Heller stated that the individual right to keep and 
bear arms is not unlimited, and certain “longstanding prohibitions” are 
“presumptively lawful.”292  Two years later, the Court “repeat[ed] those 
assurances” that Heller does not “cast doubt” on the longstanding 
prohibitions.293  This contention is not further elaborated on; instead, the 
Court noted that it will “expound upon the historical justifications for the 
exceptions” mentioned.294  Federal courts, then, were forced to decide what 
“presumptively lawful” means.  The three-judge panel of the Third Circuit in 
Barton, for example, understood “presumptively lawful” as an implication 
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“that the presumption may be rebutted,” thus opening up the courts to as-
applied challenges to the longstanding prohibitions enumerated in Heller.295  
The seven dissenting judges in Binderup were not in consensus with the 
Barton panel—or the eight judges upholding the as-applied challenge in 
Binderup—on this matter.  They critiqued the treatment of the word 
“presumptively” in Heller “as though it requires courts to consider as-applied 
challenges to the felon-in-possession ban.”296 
Five other circuits agreed with the Binderup dissenters and held that as-
applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are not permissible.  Instead of focusing on 
the word “presumptively,” the Fifth,297 Sixth,298 Ninth,299 Tenth,300 and 
Eleventh301 Circuits have focused on Heller’s assertion that it does not cast 
doubt on prohibitions like § 922(g)(1).  Additionally, the Second Circuit did 
not expressly state whether as-applied challenges are permissible but did hold 
§ 922(g)(1) constitutional in United States v. Bogle302 without distinguishing 
between facial and as-applied challenges.303 
The First Circuit has not expressly foreclosed as-applied challenges, but it 
has “expressed skepticism” about them.304  In United States v. Torres-
Rosario,305 the First Circuit noted the potential for “serious problems of 
administration, consistency and fair warning” in as-applied challenges, but 
nonetheless stated that it may be open to them.306 
The four remaining circuits—the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. 
Circuits307—have stated that as-applied challenges are permissible, but have 
not yet upheld any, citing the challenging individual’s failure to distinguish 
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his or herself to the court’s satisfaction.308  The Fourth Circuit, for example, 
acknowledged that there could be a successful as-applied challenge under the 
right circumstances but held that the fact that the predicate offense is 
nonviolent does not, alone, result in a successful as-applied challenge.309 
Thus, in addition to disagreements about the test for evaluating post-Heller 
Second Amendment challenges,310 there is a more troubling and deep split 
over whether as-applied challenges to the enumerated longstanding 
prohibitions like § 922(g)(1) are even allowed.  The Court needs to keep the 
promise it made in Heller to evaluate presumptively lawful prohibitions like 
§ 922(g)(1).  In particular, it needs to clarify whether they are susceptible to 
as-applied challenges. 
B.  The Problems with Binderup 
Should the Court hold that as-applied challenges are permissible, it must 
evaluate the two-step test set forth in Binderup.311  The question at step two 
is rather simple:  what level of scrutiny should the courts apply when 
evaluating the challenged laws?  There is consensus among the circuits that 
intermediate scrutiny is the proper level based on their reading of Heller;312 
the Court needs to confirm whether this consensus is correct. 
Step one, however, has more to address.  The Third Circuit used “historical 
justifications” because of the note in Heller, in which the Court stated it 
would “expound upon the historical justifications” for the longstanding 
prohibitions.313  The federal courts have decided that this language—
“historical justification”—dictates a key facet for evaluating Second 
Amendment restrictions.314 
First, the Court needs to confirm that the examination of historical 
justification is, in fact, the test that courts should use.  Second, the Court, as 
promised, should expound on the justification for § 922(g)(1) as a 
presumptively lawful regulation and in doing so create a standard rationale 
for why that prohibition is lawful.  The Court promised that there would be 
time enough for it to undergo this analysis, and, now that a circuit has upheld 
the first successful as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), the issue is ripe for 
discussion. 
Binderup, which upheld that first successful challenge, is itself susceptible 
to constitutional concerns.  There are at least three significant similarities 
between the issues settled by Johnson and those present in Binderup:  (1) the 
federal courts rightly are uncertain about how to apply the Court’s decision, 
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which has resulted in disagreement among and within the circuits; (2) due to 
no bright-line rules, judges must create abstraction of the ordinary crime to 
determine if the crime is violent pursuant to the ACCA, or serious pursuant 
to Binderup; and (3) a “shapeless” provision315 is infringing on fundamental 
rights, particularly the right to bear arms and the constitutional prohibition 
on excessive punishment.  Similar to Johnson, the vague standards of 
Binderup “conspire”316 to make the test unconstitutional.  In both the pre-
Johnson cases and in Binderup, standards to assess whether a predicate 
offense qualifies under a statute largely rely on an individual judge’s 
interpretation, resulting in “indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry.”317  
In Binderup, it is not clear how to determine whether a predicate offense 
constitutes a “serious” crime.  As Judge Fuentes noted in his dissent, the 
absence of rules for determining a crime’s “seriousness” means that “the 
judge’s views about the offense and the offender” could determine the 
outcome of a case,318 potentially resulting in different holdings for the same 
predicate offense.  An evaluation of “seriousness” would likely fail under an 
application of Johnson’s reasoning to this test. 
Further, the Court in Johnson found evidence of vagueness in “pervasive 
disagreement” among lower courts about the “nature of the inquiry one is 
supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.”319  
In as-applied challenges, the circuits are split over what factors to consider, 
what historical justification to rely on, what presumptions are rebuttable, 
what level of constitutional scrutiny to employ, and whether as-applied 
challenges are even permissible.  This level of disagreement should warrant 
an examination of as-applied challenges by the Supreme Court. 
The Court has already expressed its disdain for judges looking at the 
particular facts of a past criminal conviction in Taylor, where it required 
courts to evaluate predicate offenses under the categorical approach for the 
ACCA.320  Without the categorical approach, courts risk undertaking “mini-
trials” that “reconstruct” an individual’s conduct “long after the original 
conviction.”321  Based on the limited guidance provided by the Third Circuit 
in Binderup, it seems possible that district judges will be forced to conduct 
these “mini-trials” since the analysis of the predicate offense is not limited to 
the elements of the underlying offense.322  As the Court noted in Johnson, 
underlying Taylor is its belief that these “mini-trials” are tarnished by their 
“utter impracticability” and, thus, should not be permitted.323  The Binderup 
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test, as it stands, potentially invalidates the belief underlying Taylor and 
should be addressed by the Court. 
IV.  RESOLUTION 
To resolve the pervasive disagreement over the nature and permissibility 
of as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), there are two primary options:  (1) a 
statutory fix or (2) a judicial fix.  Part IV.A provides options for a statutory 
fix by Congress, should it choose to act.  Part IV.B reiterates the need for the 
Supreme Court to address as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) and notes the 
potential equal protection issues resulting from a fundamental right that 
hinges on the circuit in which a person resides. 
A.  Statutory Fix 
Should Congress agree with some circuits that there are predicate offenses 
that should no longer result in a prohibition under § 922(g)(1), it can amend 
§ 921(a)(20) to provide more offense-specific clarification of what felonies 
and state misdemeanors fall within the meaning of “crime” in the statute.  
Currently, the statute states that offenses pertaining to “antitrust violations, 
unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to 
the regulation of business practices” do not result in the prohibition on 
possessing a firearm.324  Thus, it is not unprecedented for Congress to exempt 
certain offenses from § 922(g)(1).  Congress can either add other offenses 
that are exempted from the felon-in-possession prohibition or, alternatively, 
provide a list of offenses that should result in the prohibition.  This option, 
however, could result in further questions about whether the lists of 
enumerated offenses are exhaustive and whether appeals are permitted for 
offenses not provided on any affirmative list.  Additionally, this fix would be 
limited to the enumerated offenses, without addressing the test for those not 
listed. 
Should Congress wish to limit as-applied challenges in the courts, it could 
amend the language about “what constitutes a conviction” under 
§ 921(a)(20).  Currently, the statute provides that any conviction that has 
been “expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has 
had civil rights restored” is not a conviction under the prohibition.325  
Congress could add an express declaration that other than these enumerated 
exceptions, an individual’s Second Amendment rights cannot be restored. 
Additionally, but unlikely, Congress could begin providing funds to the 
AG to undertake individual evaluations for rights restoration under § 925(c).  
Congress stopped funding the program in 1992, concluding that it was a 
difficult and subjective task prone to errors.326  Additionally, the Court in 
Bean questioned whether the judiciary had the ability to make individual 
evaluations of this nature.327  Thus, Congress may decide to re-fund the AG’s 
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evaluation program if it shares the Bean Court’s concerns about the judiciary 
making such decisions.  Re-funding the program, however, still would 
require resolution about how the federal courts should handle these as-
applied challenges since individuals denied by the AG are able to appeal the 
ruling to the district courts.328  Yet Congress’s consistent decision over thirty 
years to not fund the program means that a reversal on whether it should fund 
§ 925(c) is unlikely. 
B.  Judicial Fix 
Regardless of whether or how Congress acts, the Court needs to clarify 
issues regarding § 922(g)(1) as-applied challenges.  Particularly, it needs to 
address two overarching concerns:  (1) the permissibility of as-applied 
challenges to the enumerated presumptively lawful prohibitions and (2) the 
constitutionality of the tests created by the circuits to respond to challenges. 
The Court can address the permissibility of as-applied challenges by 
granting certiorari in such a case and determining whether § 922(g)(1) falls 
within Congress’s power to impose a complete ban on the exercise of a 
constitutional right by a class of individuals, as it did in Mitchell.329  In other 
words, it can uphold a per se felon-in-possession prohibition.  It also could 
hold that as-applied challenges are permitted. 
A determination about the permissibility of an as-applied challenge is 
necessary based on the nature of the circuit split.  Without the Court’s 
interference, it currently stands that individuals previously convicted of an 
offense in the Third Circuit could potentially have their Second Amendment 
rights restored, while individuals who committed the same offense in the 
Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, or Eleventh Circuits cannot.330  This gives rise to a 
potential equal protection problem, with a person’s fundamental rights 
determined by where they live. 
Should the Court uphold the possibility of as-applied challenges, it next 
needs to clarify the factors and test that federal courts should use in analyzing 
such challenges.  The disparities among—and within—the circuits should be 
settled by the Court, particularly whether the challenges are limited to 
individuals with predicate offenses that are “non-violent” or “non-
serious.”331  For example, within the Third Circuit, there is a split among the 
judges over what factors are relevant to determine as-applied challenges, with 
seven judges pointing to “seriousness” of the predicate offense and five 
judges pointing to the “violence” associated with the predicate offense.  The 
Court would then need to provide guidance on how to evaluate a predicate 
offense’s “seriousness” or level of violence, should it endorse either option. 
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Despite the clear constitutional concerns, the Court denied certiorari on the 
DOJ’s appeal of Binderup in June 2017.332  For the Court to uphold its 
promise from Heller to expound upon the justification for § 922(g)(1) and 
clarify this facet of Second Amendment jurisprudence, it needs to accept the 
next petition dealing with this matter, which would likely come from an 
individual in a circuit that deemed as-applied challenges impermissible or 
from an individual in the Third Circuit whose challenge was denied under the 
Binderup test.  Importantly, it is not enough for the Third Circuit to evaluate 
its Binderup test under the aforementioned analysis or any other.  Unless the 
Court acts, the circuit split will remain and an individual’s fundamental right 
to bear arms will continue to be determined by where he or she lives. 
CONCLUSION 
We teach our children that when we make promises, we must keep them.  
In Heller, the Court promised that it would clarify Second Amendment 
jurisprudence as the issues arose.  Instead, it has consistently failed to keep 
its promise and allowed a deeply unsettling circuit split over the 
permissibility and application of as-applied challenges to the longstanding 
and aggressively enforced felon-in-possession prohibition.  The Court cannot 
continue to side-step its responsibilities and must deal with the uncertainty 
and chaos created by its decision in Heller.  Anything less than deciding this 
issue would result in the Court shirking its duties by allowing a troublesome 
circuit split—whether individuals can look to the courts to have a 
fundamental right restored—to continue.  Regardless of one’s position on 
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